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THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES: TWENTIETH CENTURY
PATTERNS AND TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
PROSPECTS *
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING**
I. INTRODUCTION
The prison has been far more important to criminal justice practice
than to academic theory in the century examined by this Symposium.
Imprisonment is the dominant severe criminal sanction worldwide and there
is no evidence that its hegemony at the deep end of crime control will
change. But the study of imprisonment has not been a major feature of
criminal law theory at any time, while some aspects of prisons have
commanded attention in the literature of criminology. So imprisonment has
played a dominant role in American criminal justice but a minor role in the
discourse about criminal law. The Harvard Law Review, for example,
listed twenty-seven articles with “prison” or “imprisonment” in the title in
one hundred years of publication beginning in 1910.
The interdisciplinary character of the Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology and its crime focus made it into the leading forum in lawrelated scholarship covering issues of prison operation and function. No
fewer than 155 main articles were published with “prisons” or
“imprisonment” in their titles in a century of publications, by far the largest
concentration one would find in any scholarly journal closely linked to legal

*
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Johnson for comments, and the participants in the January 29, 2010 Symposium for
questions and commentary. Jeff Fagan introduced me to the statistical tests of the normality
of distributions and performed the calculations reported in Table 1. The efforts reported in
Part III.A of this essay were inspired by a conversation with Justin McCrary, who must
therefore share responsibility for some of the resulting analysis.
**
William G. Simon Professor of Law and Wolfen Distinguished Scholar, University of
California, Berkeley School of Law.
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education. 1 And prisons played a prominent part in the scholarly portfolio
of the Journal from the very beginning, with slightly more articles on
prisons in the first half of its volumes than in the second. The range of
prison-related topics covered from the beginning—including comparative
and empirical work—was impressive.
But little of the first half-century of the Journal touched on the central
issue in this analysis—what I shall call the scale of imprisonment. Zimring
and Hawkins define the issue of scale as analysis of the appropriate “size of
a society’s prison enterprise in relation to other criminal sanctions and to
the general population. How many prisoners? How many prisons? What
criteria should govern decisions about how large a prison enterprise should
be constructed and maintained?”2
Only one of the more than seventy articles with prison in its title that
appeared in the Journal in its first half-century was principally concerned
with rates of imprisonment: an article by Edwin Sutherland describing the
decline in rates of imprisonment in England. 3 One important reason for the
lack of scholarly attention to variation in the rate of imprisonment in the
United States is that there was not a great deal of variation over time in the
rate of imprisonment.
Indeed, the lack of dramatic variation in rates of imprisonment inspired
Alfred Blumstein and Jacqueline Cohen to construct what they called “A
Theory of the Stability of Punishment” 4 in the Journal in 1973, probably
the most important and certainly the most ironically timed article on
imprisonment in the Journal’s first century. Blumstein and Cohen posit
that levels of severe criminal punishment trend toward stability over time
and they offered as evidence of this phenomenon the rather stable rates of
imprisonment in the national aggregate over the years 1930-1970. Their
Figure 2 is reproduced from Blumstein and Cohen as my Figure 1. The
interpretation of this data was straightforward:
It can be seen from Figure 2 that over that period the imprisonment rate was
reasonably constant, having an average value of 110.2 prisoners per 100,000
population and a standard deviation during that time . . . of 8.9 prisoners per 100,000
population . . . . The stability of the time series is especially noteworthy when it is

1

The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology search was conducted by Journal staff
while the Harvard search was conducted on January 22, 2010, by Ellen Gilmore, a reference
librarian at the University of California, Berkeley Law Library.
2
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT xi (1991).
3
Edwin H. Sutherland, The Decreasing Prison Population of England, 24 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 880 (1934).
4
Alfred Blumstein & Jacqueline Cohen, A Theory of the Stability of Punishment, 64 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198 (1973).
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Figure 1
Imprisonment Rates in the United States, 1930-1970 5

considered that the population of the United States increased by over 50 percent in
the same period. 6

Twice more in the 1970s, Blumstein and his associates would produce
data and analysis to augment their stability of punishment theory, 7 but then
their entire theoretical structure was overtaken by events. From its low
point in 1972, U.S. prison populations had begun a consistent and
unprecedented climb. Figure 2, taken from U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics
data, shows an uninterrupted increase in aggregate imprisonment rates that
lasted the full generation after 1972.

5

Blumstein & Cohen, supra note 4.
Id. at 201.
7
Alfred Blumstein, Jacqueline Cohen & Daniel Nagin, The Dynamics of a Homeostatic
Punishment Process, 67 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 317 (1977); Alfred Blumstein &
Soumyo Moitra, An Analysis of the Time Series of the Imprisonment Rate in the States of the
United States: A Further Test of the Stability of Punishment Hypothesis, 70 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 376 (1979).
6
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Figure 2
Imprisonment Rates per 100,000 Population, United States, 1925-2007 8

The contrast between the four decades after 1930 and the three and a
half decades after 1972 is stark. The highest annual imprisonment rate in
the 1930-1970 period was 38% above the lowest (131.5 versus 95.5 per
100,000) and there was no clear trend over time. In the thirty years after
1972, the rate of imprisonment grew every year and the rate of
imprisonment by 2007 was five times greater than at the beginning.
The first impact on scholarship of this unprecedented increase in the
use of prisons in the United States was to end any serious discussion of
“stability of punishment.” That theory was produced by flat trends over
time in the United States after 1925 and was destroyed by the imprisonment
boom that followed 1972.
The second product of the sharp increase in American prison
population was academic interest in what features of society and
government might influence rates of imprisonment over time. Once the
dynamic and non-homeostatic qualities of imprisonment rates were
established by the history of imprisonment after 1975, the causes of
8

Blumstein & Cohen, supra note 4.
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variation in imprisonment over time and cross-sectionally became an
important topic for empirical analysis. The same upward march in prison
population that ended interest in stability of punishment generated curiosity
about the scale of imprisonment as a variable in crime policy and
governance.
There are two parallels between the “stability of punishment” exercises
of the 1970s and the more recent efforts to comprehend and measure what
determines the scale of imprisonment in the United States. The first
important shared characteristic of these two lines of inquiry is that each
theory was derived from and driven by empirical data. For all its
Durkheimian analysis, the inspiration for Blumstein and Cohen’s stability
of punishment insight was the flat distribution of imprisonment rates over
time in the United States, a pattern that invited speculation about its
potential causes. In that sense, the stability pattern was a practice in search
of a theory before any explanation was produced. The more recent work on
the scale of imprisonment was also provoked by the changing trends that
demanded explanation and analysis. All of the recent studies of
imprisonment scale have been inspired by these sharp increases, so here
again the data to be explained arrive prior to the theories to be tested.
The second parallel is an unjustified assumption of temporal
normality. Despite the fact that theories of stability and then of variability
were inspired by provocative empirical trends, the analysis of historical data
testing these theories has assumed that the periods to be analyzed are
normal and typical. In the earlier work, the observed stability was assumed
to be representative of other periods as well, so that the generality of
patterns observed could be expected. Again, in the statistical explanations
of the period after 1972, the empirical analysis has been assuming that the
prison trends of the thirty years after 1972 are representative of other
periods and public moods so that the statistical relationship and magnitude
of effects noted in this period will hold for other times and conditions.
This Article focuses on three aspects of the prison trends in the United
States since 1975. First, I discuss the size and generality of the increase in
prison population with special emphasis on the features of government that
make the pattern of growth so surprising. Second, I identify and discuss
two central empirical questions about the imprisonment boom after 1972.
Part IV explores the effects of the analysis in Part III on the proper method
of testing whether crime rates are important in predicting imprisonment.
The final section of this Article asks whether and to what extent the
volatility in the growth of prison populations might also signal that major
drops in the scale of imprisonment might happen soon.
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II. THE MAGNITUDE OF PRISON GROWTH
The thirty-five years after 1972 produced a growth in rates of
imprisonment that has never been recorded in the history of developed
nations. Figure 3 compares the rate of imprisonment in 1972 with the rate
in 2007.

Figure 3
Imprisonment in 1972 and 2007, U.S. Rates per 100,000

Source: Bureau of Census and Bureau of Justice Statistics

The 502 per 100,000 rate of state and federal imprisonment is not only
five times the rate of imprisonment in the base year of 1972 but also almost
four times the highest level of imprisonment in the four decades prior to
1970. By the early 1980s, the U.S. prison population passed its previous
high rate and continued a sharp increase without any pause for more than
two additional decades. In the generation after 1970, the rate of
imprisonment in the United States doubled (between 1972 and 1988) and
then doubled again.
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When this growth began in the 1970s, the rate of imprisonment in the
United States was on the high end of western democracies but not what
statisticians would call an “outlier” totally apart from the other nations in
the G7. 9 But the rate of imprisonment achieved by 2007 in the United
States was three times that of any fully developed nation at any point in the
post World War II era. So the extent of growth experienced by the United
States in the thirty-five years after 1970 would be remarkable for any nation
in any era. But there are three aspects of the governmental and legal
structure of the United States that make the uninterrupted upward march of
prisoners nothing short of astonishing.
The first distinct feature of U.S. government that should even out
variations in prison population over time is the decentralized structure of
criminal law and criminal punishment. The national government is
responsible for less than 10% of the persons incarcerated in the United
States, with the fifty states each responsible for determining definitions of
crimes and schedules of punishment and typically administering and
funding prison systems. This decentralized punishment policy means that
the aggregate “rates of imprisonment” in Figure 1 and Figure 2 of this
article are really an aggregate average from fifty-one different systems,
each of which has responsibility and power to set autonomous policy for
prisons. These multiple decision points should moderate the extreme values
of individual states and produce modest aggregate changes over time.
Except that the moderating influence of aggregating fifty-one different
systems was not very substantial in the generation after 1970. While there
was some variation in rates of growth from state to state, the overpowering
trend was toward sustained high rates of growth. Zimring and Hawkins
identify the 1980s as the period when the push toward and beyond
historically high rates of imprisonment became clear:
As of 1980 only eleven states reported rates of imprisonment higher than at any
previous point in the century. But a cyclical hypothesis has been decisively disproved
by prison population trends since 1980. Forty-six of the fifty states report rates of
imprisonment between 1985 and 1987 which are the highest they have experienced in
a century. 10

The near unanimity of century-high imprisonment mentioned in the
previous paragraph was noted in the mid-1980s, when the aggregate rate of
imprisonment had only come near to completing its first doubling. By the
early 1990s the journey of state governments into unprecedented high rates
of imprisonment had become universal if not uniform. So decentralized

9

ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 2, at 150 tbl.6.6; see also FRANKLING E. ZIMRING &
GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME IS NOT THE PROBLEM 31 tbl.2.2 (1997).
10
ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 2, at 152.

1232

FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING

[Vol. 100

power and multiple autonomous centers of policy power became the first
structural feature of the American system that should have moderated the
expansion of rates of imprisonment but didn’t to any significant degree.
The second element of the U.S. system in the 1970s and 1980s that one
would expect to moderate the growth of imprisonment was the absence of
significant change in penal legislation during the first two decades of the
great American prison expansion. There was no general trend toward either
increasing the number of crimes or escalating either minimum or maximum
terms of imprisonment during the period from 1970 to 1985. A few states
shifted from indeterminate to determinant sentencing systems (including
California and Illinois) in the 1970s, but there is no evidence that these
structural changes had any significant impact on the growth of
imprisonment during the period.11
The wide discretion in determining punishments in the prosecution and
sentencing systems of the United States mean that substantial changes in
aggregate punishment policy can take place without any substantial change
in the legislation governing the levels of punishment available or the choice
of punishments in individual cases. The first doubling of the U.S. prison
population after 1972 is decisive evidence that the extraordinary latitude for
exercise of discretion in American systems of criminal justice can produce
very large changes in rates of imprisonment with no important changes in
the legal framework of criminal punishment. Because there are so few
restrictions on discretionary choices in individual cases, a substantial shift
in the choices made by prosecutors and judges and police can produce very
sharp shifts in policy. Certainly for the first fifteen years of the prison
population expansion, this model of collective change in discretionary
decisions is a much better model for explaining increases that any pattern of
significant legal change. The legal structures in place in the United States
when it had a state prison population of 205,000 in 1972 were not greatly
different from the legal structures that were responsible for 800,000
prisoners in 1991.
The third systemic element that might be expected to moderate the rate
of prison growth in the United States is the relatively fixed number of
prisons and space for prisoners in the United States. Prisons are capital
goods with high fixed costs, long useful lives, and substantial lead times
between authorization and completion. By the mid-1980s, over 90% of all
the states in the United States were at the high point of the century for rates
of imprisonment so that the relatively fixed resources in these places to
house inmates were presumably close to their usual capacities. Under these
11
1 RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 206 (Alfred Blumstein et al.
eds., 1983).
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circumstances, the crowding of existing prison facilities would be expected
to restrain the rate at which still more prisoners were sent to penal facilities.
The highly discretionary processes that produce commitments to prison
should be sensitive to population pressure without delay. So the rate of
prison population growth should have moderated after the first doubling of
rates in the 1970s and 1980s as crowding pressures restrained prosecutors
and judges from unlimited expansion policies, but this did not happen.
Even with the population of prisoners swelling to unprecedented numbers
in the 1990s, the expansion of incarceration continued, new facilities were
constructed, and old prisons were retrofitted to accommodate larger
populations. The single cell became the double cell and, not infrequently,
the triple cell. So inertial forces which would ordinarily be expected to
substantially slow the expansion of prison populations were overwhelmed
by whatever systemic and political forces were driving prison expansion.
Perhaps the continual expansion of prisons tells us that capacity
restraints and decentralized punishment power were overestimated as
moderating forces on prison growth. But the unrestrained momentum of
prison population growth after 1970 shows also that the political forces
which drove the penal expansion were substantial and had substantial
impact. This may be of some importance in predicting the size and speed of
any future downward pressure on imprisonment.
III. TWO FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS
The thirty-five annual entries in the national portrait of rates of
imprisonment after 1972 in Figure 2 give the impression of a single national
pattern and a continuous upward trajectory. But looks can be deceiving.
This section addresses two fundamental questions about the character of the
thirty-five-year growth in rates of imprisonment. The first part of this
section discusses whether the aggregate growth of imprisonment in the fifty
states and the federal system is best viewed as (a) a single process with
fifty-one different levels of government participating in essentially similar
transformations of policy or (b) an aggregation of different levels or types
of policy change. The second part of the section addresses whether the
thirty-five years of increase are a single era of growth or are composed of
two or three distinct and discrete eras with different causes and magnitudes.
A. ONE PROCESS OR MANY?

The aggregate growth rates portrayed in Figure 2 are the sum of data
from fifty-one different governmental systems. As a matter of political
science and perhaps of logic, it is inaccurate to speak of the rate of
imprisonment in the United States as a single measure or to speak of the
growth rate of imprisonment in the United States as a unitary phenomenon.
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But noting the multiplicity of different components of policy in American
penality is the beginning, rather than the end, of the analysis that I am
suggesting is required. Despite the large number of states and the diversity
of their social and demographic composition, it is not unusual for
nationwide trends to be evident in matters relating to crime and punishment.
One recent example of a plenary national trend was the sharp decline in
reported serious crime in the United States during the 1990s. 12 Zimring and
Hawkins noted in 1991, “one of the most puzzling features of recent
decades is the way in which the many political units that share power in the
American criminal justice system altered their policies in a way that
increased prison populations at the same time and with similar intensity.” 13
The fourfold increase in the imprisonment rate in the United States
obviously must be a broad trend to produce an aggregate impact that large.
But there are two rather different patterns that can produce large growth in
the aggregate. The large growth numbers can mask very large differences
between highest growth and lowest growth jurisdictions where there are
significant differences between one cluster of jurisdictions and another. In
that case, aggregate growth levels are not the best way to study the causes
of differential growth. The differences between states will be at least as
important as national trends over time.
But the large number of states might all be more or less evenly
participating in a national trend, in which case studying the factors
associated with different rates of growth in different states will not provide
an obvious key to the states’ shared characteristics that are the main causes
of growth in all states. This methodological point was argued by Zimring
and Hawkins:
At stake . . . is the appropriate unit of analysis for imprisonment policy. To the extent
that the United States is a single social system, approaches that view variations in
imprisonment as an outgrowth of social and economic processes would emphasize the
national scale as a unit of analysis . . . [t]o the extent that prison population is best
viewed as an outcome of conscious governmental choice . . . the most significant
political power over imprisonment is exercised at the state level and the state should
14
be the significant unit of analysis.

While Zimring and Hawkins spotted an important issue, their analysis
jumps to premature conclusions about the appropriate level of government
for studies of the scale of imprisonment. Even if the major influences on
rates of imprisonment are political, the mechanisms that produce political

12
13
14

FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 3-24 (2007).
ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 2, at 137.
Id. at 137-38.
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change at the state level may be national in scope and might best be studied
at the national aggregate level. If most states respond in relatively uniform
ways to a national-level stimulus, interstate variation should not be the
central focus of the search for causal factors.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of percentage growth in rates of
imprisonment for the U.S. federal system and the fifty states.
The pattern of state rate growth most consistent with a unitary national
trend over the time period would show the largest concentration of states in
the middle of the distribution with very few states at both extremes. The
model for this type of pattern is a normal distribution around a mean value.
To the extent that extreme values are found, they should tend to be in
smaller states, and there should not be any clear pattern of regional
clustering in one part of the distribution. That pattern would be a
distribution consistent with a unitary national trend.
A pluralistic distribution would not concentrate in the center of the
growth rate scale, would have clusters of cases at some distance from the
mean, and would produce clusters of cases with apparent similarities in
geography, crime, or politics and different characteristic growth rates. To
the extent that a distribution suggests a unitary pattern, the appropriate level
of analysis is the national aggregate. To the extent that plural clustering is
evident in the distribution, the explanation of patterns of state variation
becomes an important focus of inquiry. But which is distribution is present
in Figure 4?
A formal statistical analysis confirms the visual impression that the
pattern of state growth rates over 1972-2007 is consistent with a normal
distribution. We use the fifty state growth rates as our sample set because
they were produced in the same fashion. The federal data are excluded
from this analysis. Two statistical tests analyze how often a distribution of
fifty outcomes (in this case percent growth in state imprisonment rate) like
that shown in Figure 4 would be likely to occur as chance variations from a
normal distribution. They are the Shapiro-Wilk and Shapiro-Francia tests
each named after its creators.15 Table 1 shows the fifty state results for the
growth rates reported in Figure 4.

15

J.P. Royston, A Simple Method for Evaluating the Shapiro-Francia W' Test of NonNormality, 32 STATISTICIAN 297 (1983); Patrick Royston, Estimating Departure from
Normality, 10 STAT. MED. 1283 (1991); S.S. Shapiro & M.B. Wilk, An Analysis of Variance
Test for Normality (Complete Samples), 52 BIOMETRIKA 591 (1965); S.S. Shapiro & R.S.
Francia, An Approximate Analysis of Variance Test for Normality, 67 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N
215 (1972).
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Table 1
The Probable Normality of Distribution of Imprisonment Growth Rates of
Fifty U.S. States 16
Test
Shapiro-Wilk
Shapiro-Francia

Obs.

W

V

Z

Probability > Z

50
50

0.97322
0.97985

1.259
1.045

0.492
0.085

0.31151
0.46612

The smaller the probability that this is a fifty-case sample from a
normal distribution, the more likely the pattern of difference observed is not
normal, with a probability of 0.05 or less a usual benchmark for strong
statistical evidence of non-normal distribution. But using a Shapiro-Wilk
test produces a probability of normal distribution of 0.31151 and the
Shapiro-Francia test probability is 0.46612. The question these tests
address is “how likely” it is that a distribution like the one being tested
could be the outcome of sampling fifty readings from a normal distribution.
The answer is “pretty likely.” There are thus no indications in these
analyses of anything other than fifty different outcomes of a uniform
process.
B. ONE POLICY ERA OR THREE?

When trends in national rates of imprisonment are charted over time in
Figure 2, the visual image is of two discrete trends—a flat and relatively
stable period from 1930 to about 1970 and a second continuously upward
period of uninterrupted growth. While the upward trajectory of increased
rates of imprisonment moderates as the base rate of prison population
increased in the 1980s and early 1990s, the number of prisoners added to
the U.S. population remained between 300,000 and 437,000 for each five
year period between 1985 and 2000. 17 So the visual temptation in a graph
like Figure 2 is bifurcation into a single era of stability and a single era of
growth.
It is however one thing to note that a growth rate has been constant
over a long period of time and quite another to assume that the substantive
influences that were driving increases in prison population in the late 1970s
are the same that were operating in the 1980s and remained stable in the
1990s. There are some indications that policy emphasis changed over the
generation of growing rates with higher rates of commitment for a wide
16
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Key Facts, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid
=13#key_facts; Nat’l Criminal Justice Reference Serv., http://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Topics/
Topic.aspx?TopicID=1.
17
See the comparison of growth rates and numbers in ZIMRING, supra note 12, at 50
fig.3.5.
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range of felonies being more important in the period prior to 1986, greater
proportionate growth in drug and sex crimes being of greater significance
from the mid 1980s to the mid-1990s, and with legislative increases in
prison terms and longer prison sentences showing a more important role in
the decade after 1995. 18
Without a doubt the changes in emphasis and priority over time during
the different eras turn generalization over the entire growth period about
causes of imprisonment growth into a hazardous occupation. The sharp
growth not only in drug prisoners, but in the percentage of state prisoners
sentenced for drug crime between 1987 and 1991 19 suggest different causal
paradigms for earlier prison growth than during the drug war’s peak years.
But there may be more unity in the process of prison growth than
preoccupation with the changing characteristics of crimes and sentences
would allow. To the extent that a relatively fixed expansion of
imprisonment might be either desired or tolerated in the years after 1972,
the crimes or sentence lengths that are added to reach that level may not be
an important influence on the motivation or tolerance for prison growth. To
the extent, then, that the relatively constant growth of imprisonment before
and after the peak emphasis on the war on drugs indicates that drug
offenders simply crowded out marginal property offenders or restrained
longer prison sentences for street criminals when they took priority in the
late 1980s, the drug panic was not itself a primary cause of change in the
growth rate of imprisonment. To the unknown extent that the pace of
national prison expansion operated independently of the categories of cases
that were given emphasis in filling the new space, the conception of the
post-1972 growth of imprisonment as a unitary trend across thirty-five
years is plausible.
IV. DOES CRIME MATTER?
This section of the analysis will apply the perspectives discussed in
Part III to review the published work discussing the role of variations in
crime rates as explanations for variations in the rate of imprisonment crosssectionally and over time. Of the potential hypotheses to use in applying
analytic tools for study of the scale of imprisonment, the link between
variations in crime and variations in imprisonment is a natural priority for
two reasons. The link between crime volume and imprisonment volume
should be a fundamental one, because criminal conviction is a necessary

18

Franklin E. Zimring, Penal Policy and Penal Legislation in Recent American
Experience, 58 STAN. L. REV. 323, 329-34 (2005).
19
See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & BERNARD E. HARCOURT, CRIMINAL LAW AND THE
REGULATION OF VICE 219 fig.3 (2007).
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condition for eligibility for prison. All prisoners at any time are convicted
criminals so that variations in the supply of crime and presumably criminals
is one obvious source of variation in the amount imprisonment is used or
demanded. This essential linkage has produced a second condition that
recommends the crime/imprisonment issue as a demonstration example—
the relatively large number of empirical studies published in this and other
journals that have explored the topic and reported significant findings when
crime rates are tested as an influence on relative growth of imprisonment in
the era of prison expansion. There have not been many published studies
on the scale of imprisonment nor have a wide variety of different analytic
strategies been used, but the crime/imprisonment relationship has still
received as much attention as any other potential cause.
Since criminal convictions are necessary (but not sufficient) conditions
for imprisonment, an increase in convictions is one obvious reason why
more people would be sent to prison, and one natural influence on the
volume of convicted offenders is the volume of reported crimes. Several
published studies have found that variation in crime at the state level predict
variations in the growth of imprisonment at the state level. But a detailed
comparison of the data analyzed suggests several limits to existing studies
of the crime versus rates of imprisonment relationship.
One limit of the current studies is that the time periods studied were
during the post-1972 uninterrupted growth in rates of imprisonment. Does
growth in crime predict growth in imprisonment during periods with less
growth to explain? If not, the relationship of crime trends and prison trends
may be much weaker in more “normal” periods of relative stability in
imprisonment rates in which variations in rates of many crimes are not
predictive of differential imprisonment growth.
And even in periods of high growth in imprisonment, the type of
growth most clearly associated with increasing prison numbers may have a
large effect on the impact of crime rates on prison growth. In the first era of
growth from 1974 to 1987, the most prominent cause of incarceration
growth was the increasing rate of imprisonment for high volume felonies at
the margin between prison and lesser sanctions—burglary, auto theft,
unarmed robbery, assault. 20 Variations in crime rates might have a strong
influence on prison use by increasing the number of such offenses just
when the prison risk for such crimes was going up—the two forces might
interact to redouble the risk increase that was occurring independently. But
variations in reported part I or index crime (property crimes with victims
and violent crimes of some seriousness) levels would not have as strong an
20
See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, PRISON POPULATION
CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY IN CALIFORNIA 14 (1992).
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influence during an imprisonment policy focus driven by increases in
sentenced drug offenders and non-rape sex offenders—the special features
of the increase in imprisonment over the period 1987-1995, because there is
no count of drug offenses or of non-rape sex offenses that would measure
variations in the rate of these types of offenders. So the relationship of
variations in official crime rates to differential growth rates of state
imprisonment should be much weaker in an era of special emphasis on
these non-index crimes. In fact, many of the studies that find strong
crime/imprisonment links involved data from the first period of increasing
prison risk for marginally serious index crimes (e.g., Table 1 in Pfaff). 21
For this reason, such studies probably overestimate the impact on official
rates of index crime and prison population even for the entire set of high
growth eras.
And because these studies were only attempting to access the role of
differential crime growth in explaining state-to-state differences in growth
of imprisonment, the studies that were conducted produce no direct
evidence on the question of how much of the growth in imprisonment at the
national level was driven by the growth of crime. The greater the likelihood
that a single national-level process was taking place during the period
beginning in the 1970s, the more appropriate it becomes to explore the
relationships between crime and imprisonment over time at the national
level.
Figure 5 uses homicide rates over time as a proxy for crime trends
nationally and compares temporal trends for homicide and imprisonment
rate per 100,000 for the United States as a whole.
Homicide is selected as one proxy for serious crime because it is
reliably reported and a good index of variation in rates of life threatening
violence. 22 Over the forty-three years after 1964, the observed rates of
homicide and imprisonment are on very different trend lines. Homicide
rates double between 1964 and 1974 in the United States, while
imprisonment rates continue to decline until 1973. When imprisonment
rates begin to rise over the late 1970s, homicide rates first fall then increase
back to just above the 1974 high in 1980, then drop substantially until 1984,
increase from 1986 to 1991, then drop steadily throughout the 1990s and
level off in the years after 2000.
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ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 9, at 67-71.
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The temporal pattern for imprisonment shows little of the cyclical
variations of homicide. Imprisonment drifts downward for eight years and
then turns up for thirty-five years. One might argue that the increase in
homicide in the late 1960s starts to drive imprisonment upward after a long
lag, but an eight-year gap between the increase in killings and the increase
in imprisonment would be much larger than any standard economic or
policy lags. And the shape of the patterns for homicide and imprisonment
are very different for the entire period rather than revealing similarities
when lags are introduced. There is a significant relationship between
homicide and incarceration trends, but it is negative, (-0.53) over the period
1964-2007. This might be good news for those who suggest that
imprisonment reduces crime, but it is bad news for advocates that crime
rates drive imprisonment rates.
Figure 6 shows trends in robbery and imprisonment to parallel the
homicide story.
This time, the overall relationship between robbery and imprisonment
is nonexistent (-0.08), consistent with the two trends operating
independently of any systematic interaction.
Of course adding time lags and other statistical bells and whistles will
produce variation in statistical outcomes. But the central point of these
exercises seems secure: the notion that variations in crime in the period
after 1964 are driving imprisonment rates, which is clear in the study of
interstate variations, is not well supported once attention shifts to the
national aggregate. So if that is the appropriate level of analysis (a
plausible implication of a normal distribution of growth rates at the state
level), it’s back to the drawing board.
V. IS VOLATILITY A ONE-WAY STREET?
In retrospect, the mid-1970s witnessed a transition between relatively
stable imprisonment trends to sharp upward variation in incarceration rates.
But the description of prison population trends as “volatile” in this period
may be inaccurate if that term is intended in its ordinary economic or
linguistic sense of changeable or “tending to fluctuate sharply and
regularly.” The recent history of imprisonment in the United States has
established that populations tend to fluctuate sharply and regularly, but only
in an upward direction. The “average” increase in incarceration rate per
100,000 population has been about fourfold, a very substantial variation
indeed. And there is strong evidence in recent years that growth rates have
declined and increases in aggregate population levels are, by recent
standards, quite small. Some state systems have declining rates of
imprisonment already, and there is reason to believe that stability and
decline may touch many systems in the near future.
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So declining rates of imprisonment are a likelihood at some point in
the American near term. What is not known is the scale of decline that
might follow the increases of recent history. Are the large increases of
recent history indications that the downward variations in incarceration
rates might approach the scale of the post-1973 increases? Or are there
inertial forces in the politics or governance of imprisonment that can be
expected to restrain the downward variation of prison population so that
cyclical movements appear non-symmetrical?
Illustrations of the
contrasting arithmetic of symmetrical versus asymmetrical downward
variation are not difficult to construct. The equivalent of a 400% increase
in prison population rate is an 80% decrease in rate per 100,000 from the
inflated base rate of imprisonment back to break even. Is downward
variation of that magnitude either possible or likely in a thirty-year frame of
the twenty-first century?
There are no downward variations in prison population of that scale in
the history of any developed nation on earth, just as there were no
precedents for the statistical growth documented in Figure 2 until it
happened. The number of significant decreases in prison populations in
U.S. history is rather small, and the size of recorded declines to date are far
less than half the 80% decline that would constitute statistical symmetry
with the late twentieth-century increase. California produced a decline in
rates of imprisonment in the early 1970s of approximately 30%, 23 and the
New York State system, dominated by New York City prisoners, has
dropped in the wake of the city’s 80% drop in most forms of serious
crime. 24 The early California experience lasted just under a decade before it
was overtaken by increases in the 1980s.
The extent to which the scale of current imprisonment is reversible is a
question not of statistics but of the political economy of imprisonment.
There are a variety of institutional and political reasons why prison
population rates might be stickier on the way down than they proved to be
on the way up. Once the physical capacity to imprison has been expanded,
there may be inertial forces or economies of scale that bias systems to
continue to use them. The expanded scale of prison capacity may also
reflect changing public preferences for imprisonment and these preferences
may endure independent of any real economies in the variable costs of
incarceration. And while public preferences and values may not have
strong independent influence on rates of imprisonment, this attitudinal
23
Rosemary Gartner, Anthony Doob & Franklin Zimring, The Past Is Prologue?
Decarceration in California: Then and Now, CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming
2011).
24
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE!, NEW YORK AND THE FUTURE OF
CRIME CONTROL ch. 8 (forthcoming 2011).
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software might interact with changes in both crime rates and public fear of
crime to create political pressures for penal expansion or limits on
contraction.
Of all the modern historical trends in imprisonment, the period after
1994 presents the most impressive evidence of asymmetrical volatility for
American imprisonment. This was the era when imprisonment rates in the
United States defied gravity, when incarceration rates increased while crime
rates decreased. To the extent that the attitudes and political circumstances
of the middle and late 1990s hold in the future, the case for volatility as a
one-way street is quite strong. But there are two reasons to suspect that the
conditions that obtained in the late 1990s will vary. The first issue is that
longer exposure to stable or declining crime rates might reduce fear and
soften public hostility. There may be time lags of some size before
declining crime and violence is transformed into assumptions of social
safety. The slowing of growth in incarceration rates seven and eight years
after the crime decline started may be a typical lag between statistics and
perception in public safety.
There is a second respect in which the 1990s may not be representative
of future attitudes toward crime and punishment. The mid-1990s was an
era of punitive hostility unparalleled in modern U.S. history and this may
not have been closely linked to crime rates. The era of three strikes and
truth in sentencing may have been driven by unsustainable levels of fear
and hostility rather than a continuing chronic condition. What we know for
sure after the mid-1990s is that the software of public fear and concern is
more predictive of policy than any trends in crime or drug use. What is not
known is the variability of public attitudes in the second and third decade of
the twenty-first century. Stay tuned!
VI. CONCLUSION
Just as theories of stability of punishment followed sustained periods
of little change in prison population, a concern with explaining wide
variations in rates of imprisonment grew out of the fourfold expansion of
rates of imprisonment in the United States in the generation after 1970.
Among the long list of unanswered questions about the determinants of
rates of imprisonment is whether the dramatic rise in prison population over
the past decades is a new norm for the scale of imprisonment or a precursor
to significant declines in the rates of imprisonment in the early decades of a
new century.
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